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Presnell: Florida's Simultaneous Death Act:
Need for Reform
[V/ol. XVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

FLORIDA'S SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT: NEED
FOR REFORM
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was drafted in 1940 in response to the ever increasing frequency of multiple deaths occurring
in a common disaster, and the existing confusion created by the
statutory or common law provisions for the disposition of property of
persons who died simultaneously.' Florida was one of the first states
to adopt the act in the year following its presentation to the states by
the Uniform Commissioners, 2 and the act has since been adopted by
the great majority of state jurisdictions. s Prompted by a Florida decision, which the commissioners felt had misinterpreted section 2 of
the act, an amendment was drafted in 1953 to clarify the section and
to preclude a similar inequitable result in the future.4 More than
a decade has elapsed, and Florida has yet to adopt the amended provision.
The decision that occasioned the commissioners to amend the act
occurred in the case of Miami Beach First National Bank v. Miami
Beach First National Bank.s The case involved the disposition of an
estate that had been left in trust, the net income to be paid to the
decedent's wife so long as she lived, and upon her death the corpus
of the estate was to be divided among several remaindermen as shall
be living. The will further provided that if any of the class of beneficiaries should be dead and leave direct descendants not included in
the class, these descendants should receive the shares of the beneficiary,
otherwise the number of shares to be distributed should be reduced by
the number of the class deceased at the time of death of the wife.
The litigation ensued after the wife and one of the remaindermen
died in a common disaster. Although the remainderman left no
descendants, the executor of her estate as claimant in the case sought
her share of the trust estate under section 2 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, which provides that: 6
Where two or more beneficiaries are designated to take successively by reason of survivorship under another person's disposition of property and there is no sufficient evidence that
these beneficiaries have died otherwise than simultaneously, the
property thus disposed of shall be divided into as many equal
I. See Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 158 (1957).
2. FLA. STAT. §736.05 (1963).
3. See table, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 92 (Supp. 1964).
4. COMMISSIONERS, UNIFORM STATE LAWS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
248 (1953).
5. 52 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1951).
6. FLA. STAT. §736.05 (2) (1963).
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portions as there are successive beneficiaries, and these portions
shall be distributed respectively to those who would have taken
in the event that each designated beneficiary had survived.
The other remaindermen contested the claim on the ground that
the claimant had only a contingent remainder under the will, which
could vest only in the event that she either survive the wife or leave
direct descendants. They argued that the statute should not apply to
the trust since the life estate of the wife and the claimant's remainder
were unequal estates. But the court, in holding for the claimant,
noted that the statute made no distinction between equal and unequal
estates, and concluded that since the life tenant and remainderman
were successive beneficiaries, the statute would be applicable. The
court believed that the application of the statute to the facts of the
case would produce an equitable result and would also remove from
speculation the question whether the interest of the remainderman did
or did not vest.
Although the court may have been correct in its literal interpretation of the act, 7 this was not a proper situation for its application.
The act was designed to present an effective and workable rule for
the disposition of property when the disposition would otherwise
be in question due to the simultaneous death of successive beneficiaries. 8 But if the court had followed the obvious intent of the
donor in this case, the disposition of the estate would not have been
in question. It was clearly the testator's desire to allow only the
designated remaindermen or their direct descendants to share in the
use and enjoyment of his estate. The will explicitly provided that
in the event a beneficiary did not survive the wife or leave direct
descendants, the number of shares should be reduced accordingly.
The obvious import of this provision was to keep his estate among
the immediate family. Since the remainderman died simultaneously
with the life tenant and left no descendants, her executor should not
have been allowed to share in the estate under the terms of the will.
The effect of applying the statute was to vest the claimant's remainder
and thereby defeat the plain intent of the donor. Such an application
not only subverts the basic purpose of the act by frustrating the intent
of the testator, but contrary to the court's belief, reaches an inequitable
result.
This reasoning was adequately expressed by the commissioners in
the 1953 amendment, which was drafted in response to the inequitable
result reached by the Florida Court. Section 2 of the act as amended
provides in part that, "if property is so disposed of that the right of
7.
8.

COMMISSIONERS,

See 9C
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op. cit. supranote 4, at 248.
LAws ANN. 160 (1957).
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a beneficiary to succeed to any interest therein is conditional upon
his surviving another person, and both persons die, and there is no
sufficient evidence that the two have died otherwise than simultaneously, the beneficiary shall be deemed not to have survived." 9 Therefore, a beneficiary whose claim to the estate is contingent upon his
outliving the other person involved in the common disaster will not
be allowed to share in the estate under this amended provision. This
would clearly obviate the claimant's contention in the Florida case,
and insure that donative intent would prevail in cases involving unequal estates. The property will be divided among the beneficiaries
as if each had survived, only in situations in which the disposition
of the property is not contingent upon survivorship.1 °
Although only a few states have adopted the 1953 amendment,11 its
absence would not necessarily indicate that the various jurisdictions
would reach the same result as the Florida court. But since Florida
is now committed to the inequitable holding due to its unique judicial
interpretation of the act, it is recommended that the legislature adopt
the amended provision to rectify the situation and preclude a similar
decision in the future. If remedial action is to be taken, it must be
provided by the legislature. In its decision the court recognized that
the case amounted to a new rule for property succession, but felt that
such was the intent of the legislature.12 Since it is unlikely that the
court will overrule its decision, it is necessary for the legislature to
indicate that such an interpretation of the act was not intended. This
can most easily be accomplished by adopting the 1953 amendment.
"In order to attain the goal of uniformity in a field of law, it is
essential not only that the relevant statutory law of the jurisdictions
be in accord, but also that identical or similar provisions of that law
be construed in the same manner by the various courts which interpret it." 3 Until Florida adopts the amended provision that was
9. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Acr §2. (Emphasis added.)
10. Ibid.
11. Of the forty-two states that adopted the original act, only four have
amended their act to conform to the 1953 amendment as of November 1, 1964:
ARK. STAT. ANN. §61-125 (Supp. 1963); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190A, §2 (Supp.
1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §471.020 (Supp. 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. §237.10(2) (1957).
Of the four states that adopted the act after 1953, Oklahoma and New Mexico
adopted the act as amended, while Mississippi and Utah adopted the act in its
original form. Miss. CODE ANN. §479.02 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. §29-1-25 (Supp.
1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §1002 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. §74-5-2 (Supp.
1965). The District of Columbia also adopted the act as amended. D.C. CODE ANN.
§18-903 (1961).
12. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 52 So.
2d 893, 896 (1951).
13 Day, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
8 U. FLA. L. REV.276, 282 (1955).
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occasioned by its own judicial interpretation of the act, Florida will
not be in accord with either the purpose or the application of the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act and will be committed to an inequitable rule of property succession.
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